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measures, detailed knowledge about pathogenesis and 
etiology is paramount. However, before candidate causes 
can be identified, the causative framework, i.e. the con-
cept of PBD causation in general, deserves consider-
ation.
 In this article, we do not offer an exhaustive overview 
of the various clinical and imaging characteristics of 
PBD, which is provided in several recent reviews  [1–3] . 
Instead, we expand upon recent reviews of PBD etiology 
and pathogenesis  [4–6] with an eye on causal inference, 
writing from the perinatal neuroepidemiologists’ per-
spective.
 Causal Inference and a Neopragmatic View of 
Etiology Research 
 Modern etiology research in humans needs to be based 
on sound empirical methods  [7] . This type of research 
relies on the observation of associations between expo-
sures and outcomes, usually in humans, with the goal of 
identifying preventable causes of disease. On the other 
hand, we are all too familiar with the notion that ‘asso-
ciation can never prove causation’. This notion has two 
components in the present context – the general problem 
of proof by observation, and the specific problem of how 
to define causes in empirical etiology research.
 The general problem has been formulated by David 
Hume (1711–1776), who claimed that multiple observa-
tions of similar co-occurrences do not justify any (induc-
tive) conclusions beyond just these observations. This 
concept was extended by Sir Karl Popper (1902–1994) 
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 Abstract 
 The search for causes of perinatal brain damage needs a sol-
id theoretical foundation. Current theory apparently does 
not offer a unanimously accepted view of what constitutes 
a cause, and how it can be identified. We discuss nine poten-
tial theoretical misconceptions: (1) too narrow a view of what 
is a cause (causal production vs. facilitation), (2) extrapolat-
ing from possibility to fact (potential vs. factual causation), 
(3) if X, then invariably Y (determinism vs. probabilism), (4) 
co-occurrence in individuals vs. association in populations, 
(5) one cause is all that is needed (single cause attribution vs. 
multicausal constellations), (6) drawing causal inferences 
from very small numbers of observations (the tendency to 
generalize), (7) unstated causal inferences, (8) ignoring het-
erogeneity, and (9) failing to consider alternative explana-
tions for what is observed. We hope that our critical discus-
sion will contribute to fruitful research and help reduce the 
burden of perinatal brain damage. 
 Copyright © 2007 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 The heterogeneous spectrum of perinatal brain dam-
age (PBD) in term and preterm infants warrants a de-
tailed consideration of the equally heterogeneous spec-
trum of causes of PBD. For identification of preventive 
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who offered his ‘falsificationist’ approach, which states 
that no number of similar observations can prove a hy-
pothesis, while just one dissimilar observation can refute 
the conjecture – a theory perceived and discussed in both, 
statistics  [8] and epidemiology  [9–11] . An overview of the 
more recent philosophical discourse on causality  [12, 13] 
is far beyond the scope of this paper.
 The specific problem, i.e. how to conceptualize (and 
compute) ‘causation’, is far from simple and has produced 
a vast theoretical literature in the fields of epidemiology 
 [14–18] and computer science  [19, 20] . According to what 
is probably the most widely-known view in the epidemi-
ologic literature  [18, 21] , we should move from looking at 
individual component causes of disease, i.e. pieces of the 
pie, towards the appreciation of causal constellations, i.e. 
the entire pie. Only when the pie is complete will disease 
follow. This view might be considered inherently deter-
ministic, because it holds that  whenever the causal con-
stellation is complete, disease follows  inevitably . Howev-
er, even in light of considerable progress in molecular 
epidemiology  [22] , and even if we supplement epidemiol-
ogy with appropriate experimental work, we are unlikely 
to discover the  entire  causal constellation in humans just 
by observation. ‘Even the most careful and detailed mech-
anistic dissection of individual events cannot provide 
more than associations, albeit at a finer level’  [18] .
 Thus, in practice, all etiology research can provide 
seems to be restricted to an approximation of ‘real’ causes 
via the identification of risk factors. In theory, research-
ers may wish to fix the deterministic pie problem above 
by ‘simply think(ing) of the components as contributing 
together to the probability of the effect, rather than being 
sufficient for it’  [17] .
 Could it thus be that finding ‘real’ causes of disease 
will remain elusive, because the question is ill posed? In-
deed, some current thinking suggests we should stop ‘de-
scribing (human inquiry) as an attempt to correspond to 
the intrinsic nature of reality (and start) describing it as 
an attempt to serve transitory purposes and solve transi-
tory problems’  [23] . The major proponent of what is 
sometimes called ‘neopragmatism’ is Richard Rorty, self-
declared ‘anti-dualist’, who suggests that Platonic-Carte-
sian notions of ‘the absolute and the relative, the found 
and the made, object and subject, nature and convention, 
reality and appearance’ should be replaced with ‘new 
ways of speaking’. Rorty suggests we should ‘develop 
tools which will enable (humans) to enjoy more pleasure 
and less pain’. Along these very lines, could not we just 
stop taking ‘causal relationships to be the fundamental 
building blocks both of physical reality and of human 
understanding of that reality’ [ 19 , p. xiii/xiv] and start ac-
cepting observed associations, supplemented with some 
experimental evidence, as a sufficient starting point for 
change? Even if this was just changing language instead 
of solving a pressing philosophical problem, would not 
the ends (improved public health) justify the means (ig-
noring Hume, plus dropping the dualistic worldview)?
 In essence, we suggest that it does not matter whether 
we call an observed link between exposure and outcome 
‘causation’ or ‘association’. What does matter is that iden-
tifying risk factors for disease, and then proactively re-
moving/reducing the identified risk factors from popula-
tions can improve the human condition.
 Clinical investigators are reluctant to expose human 
subjects to interventions that do not have a sound basic 
science rationale. To aid in the process of selecting risk 
factors for avoidance/modification, in the final section of 
this paper we offer criteria for what is worthy of evalua-
tion. These should not be viewed as criteria for causes of 
disease.
 Causal Concepts in PBD 
 Consider two scenarios.  In the first, short-term intra-
partum and neonatal insults are considered sufficient to 
damage the neonatal brain  [24–26] . In the second, long-
standing antenatal exposures are recognized as poten-
tially changing the milieu in the fetal central nervous sys-
tem, thereby playing a causative role in PBD  [27–32] . In 
both scenarios, however, it might be helpful to integrate 
endogenous (e.g. maturation-related anatomic and/or 
physiologic/genetic) factors with exogenous (e.g. insult/
milieu-related) phenomena, such as energy failure and/or 
inflammation  [33] .
 Moreover, the two scenarios differ with regard to what 
qualifies as an insult or harmful milieu. While matura-
tional factors (for which gestational age is a surrogate 
 [34] ) clearly contribute to PBD occurrence, circulatory 
and inflammatory risk factors are currently among the 
most frequently studied. Unfortunately, this recent devel-
opment is frequently misinterpreted as an attempt to re-
place one ‘old’ cause with a ‘new’ one. This perception, 
however, neglects the potential advantages of multiple 
cause appreciation, most importantly: an increase in the 
number of potential prevention opportunities.
 A misperception of what constitutes a causal rela-
tionship appears to contribute to this misunderstand-
ing. Although the issues discussed in this paper apply to 
a large extent to disease causation in general, our area of 
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concern is PBD causation. In particular, we are inter-
ested in white matter damage (WMD), the term we use 
for focal and diffuse structural damage to the paraven-
tricular white matter identified mainly in preterm new-
borns  [35] .
 Nine Misconceptions in PBD Causation Thinking 
 We wrote this essay to raise awareness about issues 
that epidemiologists take for granted but others might 
not appreciate. We very much want to avoid embarrass-
ing anyone who might have expressed any of these mis-
conceptions. Thus, we have minimized identifying pa-
pers that exemplify the very conceptual lapses we want 
the reader to recognize and avoid.
 In the following sections, we expand on each of these 
nine issues. Because replacing some of what we consider 
misconceptions with new perspectives can be difficult, 
we created the table ( table 1 ) to aid in this process. We end 
this paper by offering some conclusions based on our dis-
cussion.
 Causal Production vs. Causal Facilitation 
 We consider too simplistic the view that some factor is 
a cause only if it produces disease. A more appropriate 
view might be that a factor is considered a cause when it 
contributes to disease occurrence, either by producing it 
or by facilitating its production by other causes.
 Some exposures by themselves do not influence the 
risk of a disease. In the presence of other exposures, how-
ever, they enhance the occurrence of disease. More com-
monly, the exposure has a small influence in isolation, 
but in the presence of another exposure, has a greater 
than additive effect. This concept of ‘sensitization’  [36] is 
exemplified by the observation that the extent of cerebral 
infarction in 7-day old rats is greater following the com-
bination of a low dose of endotoxin and a short period of 
hypoxia-ischemia than by either exposure alone  [37] . 
Similarly, exposure to proinflammatory cytokines in-
creases ibotenate-iduced excitotoxic cortical and WMD 
in a murine preterm model  [38] .
 On the epidemiologic level, this phenomenon is called 
‘effect modification’, and under particular circumstances 
we may face effect modifiers that are themselves not pro-
Table 1. Nine conceptual problems in causation thinking, common assumptions associated with these, and proposals how to avoid 
causal misattribution
No. Conceptual problem Assumption Proposal
1 Causal production vs. causal
facilitation
X is cause of Y only if X produces Y X is cause of Y if X contributes to the occur-
rence of Y, even if other exposures are required
2 Potential vs. factual causation
(extrapolating from possibility to fact)
If X can cause Y (e.g. in experiments), 
then X does cause Y in real life
If X can cause Y, then X might cause Y
3 Determinism vs. probabilism If X then always Y If X then Y more frequently than if not X
4 Co-occurrence vs. association If X and Y co-occur, then X must
be a cause of Y
If X and Y occur together more frequently than 
expected by chance, X might be a cause of Y
5 Single cause attribution vs. multicausal 
constellations
Y is caused only by X Y has many causes, including X, even in any 
individual
6 Generalization If X is a cause of Y in one instant,
X is always a cause of Y
If X is a cause of Y in one instant, X can be a 
cause of Y
7 Unstated causal inferences If X is severe, it causes Y;
if less severe, it causes Z
Find support before accepting
8 Ignoring heterogeneity If X1 is similar to X2, they can be 
 combined as one
If X1 is similar to X2, evaluate similarity before 
combining
9 Failure to consider alternatives What I see is true Consider that what is seen can be explained 
away and is not what it appears to be
In this table, X is an exposure or characteristic and Y and Z are disorders of interest.
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ducers of disease. For example, in one of our recent stud-
ies we looked at the risk of WMD after exposure to hypo-
carbia  [39] . In these analyses, maternal antibiotic therapy 
was associated with neither hypocarbia nor WMD. How-
ever, among children whose mothers had received antibi-
otic treatment, the adjusted odds ratio for hypocarbia 
predicting WMD was 0.9 (95% confidence interval 0.3–
2.9), while it was 2.7 (1.1–6.6) among infants whose moth-
ers had not received antibiotic therapy. Clearly, although 
not associated with WMD in the first place, maternal an-
tibiotic therapy was associated with WMD occurrence by 
virtue of conveying information about modifying the ef-
fect of hypocarbia (or its antecedents or correlates) on 
WMD risk.
 One (neopragmatic) way to avoid the failure to recog-
nize causal facilitation is to enhance our etiologic lexicon 
by using terms such as ‘contributor’ or ‘risk factor’ a bit 
more frequently. Then we can talk about phenomena that 
contribute to disease, and not have confusion about what 
constitutes a cause.
 Potential vs. Factual Cause 
 We sometimes fall into the trap of what might be called 
‘extrapolation from possibility to fact’. By this we mean 
that some tend to think that if X can cause Y in the ex-
perimental setting, X does cause Y in real-life situations. 
The experimental evidence from perinatal neuroscience 
that some exposures can result in WMD is large and con-
tinues to grow  [4] . Such experimental evidence, however, 
shows only that these factors are candidate causes of 
WMD. We should not assume they are causes in hu-
mans.
 Along these lines, the current assumption that WMD 
in immature human newborns is caused by hypoxia-isch-
emia is an extrapolation error, but not from possibility to 
fact, but from missing data. In essence, the inferential er-
ror has no basis in fact. In the article that coined the term 
‘periventricular leukomalacia’, the authors considered 
the entity ‘a neonatal form of anoxic encephalopathy’ 
 [40] . However, they did not offer any supporting evidence 
why anoxia should be the cause for the damage observed. 
Despite this lack of data, an article published in 2002 cit-
ed this paper this way, ‘[Banker and Larroche] found ad-
ditional pathological changes within the lungs of all in-
fants examined and noted that the majority had experi-
enced a period of apnea or cardiac arrest requiring 
resuscitation. Anoxia was recorded as present without ex-
ception in every infant in their series’  [25] . Although 
 anoxia may have been recorded, it was not measured at 
all. The authors assumed anoxia was present because the 
infants had had trouble breathing or had experienced 
cardiac arrest. It might be of interest to clinicians respon-
sible for keeping oxygen saturation values of preterm in-
fants in the ‘acceptable’ range that multiple experimental 
studies support the claim that hypoxia without ischemia 
does not cause brain damage  [41–43] and that ventilated 
preterm newborns are ‘able to maintain adequate cere-
bral perfusion at a MABP in the range of 23.7–39.3 mm 
Hg’  [44] .
 Until today, the anoxia/asphyxia/hypoxia-ischemia 
complex of putative causes has its accustomed place in the 
introductions of scientific articles and textbooks on pre-
term brain damage (see below, section ‘Single Cause At-
tribution vs. Multicausal Constellations’), as well as in the 
courtroom. This is mainly because in response to such 
initial ‘observations’ of anoxia, a very successful rat mod-
el of hypoxia-ischemia has been developed  [43, 45] , mod-
ifications of which are probably among the most com-
monly used models of PBD. One should not cease asking 
the question how relevant hypoxia-ischemia is among 
term, and even more among preterm infants, for causa-
tion of PBD and other neonatal disorders such as necro-
tizing enterocolitis  [46] .
 In sum, the evidence in the literature that hypoxia-
ischemia can indeed cause brain lesions is vast  [26] . How-
ever, the inference that brain damage in human new-
borns must therefore be hypoxic-ischemic in origin is not 
well supported by solid observational evidence  [47] .
 Determinism vs. Probabilism 
 Most people think of causation as an ‘if, then’ sequence 
of events. The generalized example is ‘if X, then Y’. Now, 
the backbone of determinist thinking is the assumption 
that ‘if X, then always Y’. For some phenomena, such as 
those well-described by natural laws, the determinist 
view might indeed apply. However, the applicability of 
natural laws to disease processes might be less common 
than frequently assumed.
 The generalized form for the probabilistic approach to 
causation  [48, 49] is ‘if X, then the probability of Y is in-
creased’. Our inference is that when we see X, we think 
that the occurrence of Y is more likely than if we do not 
see X.
 Infection with HIV is considered the cause of AIDS 
 [50] . However, not all HIV-infections lead to the rapid 
development of the full-blown clinical syndrome called 
AIDS, as illustrated by the existence of highly exposed, 
persistently seronegative individuals and HIV-1-infected 
long-term nonprogressors  [51] . Simply put, it is not yet 
known whether some of these individuals will ever de-
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velop signs of AIDS. To elucidate the protective charac-
teristics among these few cases will greatly improve our 
understanding of AIDS pathogenesis and causation.
 Along these same lines, some investigators might put 
too much deterministic emphasis on what they expect to 
follow a certain exposure. In one recent study, for example, 
investigators noted that almost half of their cases of WMD 
‘occurred unexpectedly in infants who did not appear to 
have an obvious cause, as they had not experienced a severe 
hemodynamic event’  [52] . Apparently, some favor certain-
ty over likelihood. We are confident that based on our dis-
cussion, at least some determinists will probably consider 
becoming determined probabilists (pun intended).
 Co-Occurrence in Individuals vs. Association in 
Populations 
 Some tend to rely on anecdotal evidence even in an era 
when information about etiology comes from data de-
rived from research in large groups of subjects. We, on 
the other hand, suggest that the evidence-based perspec-
tive  [53] should not only be applied to therapy studies, but 
also to etiology research  [54] .
 The emphasis on the individual is typically taken by 
clinicians interested in causation issues in individual pa-
tients. For example, a physician would never have the 
slightest doubt about the etiology of lung cancer in a 
heavy smoker, but would always wonder about its patho-
genesis in a lifelong nonsmoker.
 WMD is often seen in the sickest preterm newborns. 
In the same infants, the blood pressure tends to be on the 
low side. Does this mean that a low systemic blood pres-
sure must be a cause for WMD? Indeed, the majority of 
studies of observational studies have not shown an asso-
ciation between measures of systemic blood flow and 
WMD [for an overview,  see appendix of reference  55 ].
 The concepts of co-occurrence and association are re-
lated, but by no means identical. Hybrid papers that mix 
the small- and large-sample perspectives have the poten-
tial to be confusing.
 Association does not prove causation, as recently 
shown for the association between changes in regional 
stork populations and birth rates  [56] . Similarly, the 
harmful effects of smoking are not supported by the ob-
servation that all smokers die, but by the observation that 
smoking increases the likelihood of lung cancer and/or 
death at an earlier age above what we know from popula-
tions of nonsmokers.
 In keeping with this view, finding so-called ‘proin-
flammatory’ cytokines in areas of neonatal WMD does 
not mean that they contributed to the damage. Their pres-
ence might also indicate that they are part of other re-
sponses to an injurious stimulus. For example, they might 
play a neuroprotective role, contribute to diminishing the 
inflammation, or participate in repair  [57, 58] .
 Single Cause Attribution vs. Multicausal 
Constellations 
 Imagine an elderly lady being hit by a bus. She breaks 
her leg. Although this has shown that bus accidents can 
cause broken legs, to what extent does this support the 
hypothesis that bus accidents are a frequent, the main, the 
only cause of broken legs? How much of the accident can 
be attributed to the elderly lady (did she jay walk?), the 
driver, poor lighting, fog, slippery road conditions, me-
chanical failure, another driver who caused the bus driv-
er to swerve?
 Attributing an outcome to one antecedent has been 
labeled ‘single cause attribution’  [59] . This is most often 
exemplified by what we call the ‘individual perspective’ 
in the previous section. One picks a case of PBD, search-
es for some event deemed an appropriate insult, and at-
tributes causal properties to this event.
 The errors of single cause attribution are also be made 
by academicians and investigators. The following are ex-
amples.
 A popular textbook of neonatal neurology places the 
content dealing with WMD causation in a chapter labeled 
‘Hypoxic-Ischemic Encephalopathy: Neuropathology 
and Pathogenesis’. The author tips his hat to other pos-
sible etiologies, but makes abundantly clear that, in his 
eyes, his placement of the material is appropriate.
 Hypoxia-ischemia (oxygen-glucose deprivation) 
causes brain damage in the laboratory. So do excitotoxins 
and inflammogens. Why choose hypoxia-ischemia as 
THE single cause, especially when this position is NOT 
supported by studies of humans?
 Reports of clinical trials of head cooling for the neo-
natal disorder characterized by obtundation and brain-
stem dysfunction labeled the disorder hypoxic-ischemic 
encephalopathy. Sometimes this disorder has no obvious 
antecedent. Other times, epidemiologic studies show that 
it is associated with fetal/maternal inflammation. The 
disorder’s label reflects the simplistic thinking that the 
existence of the disorder means that there must have been 
unseen/undocumented hypoxia-ischemia. Plaintiffs’ at-
torneys tell the jury that the doctors caring for the unre-
sponsive baby diagnosed her condition as hypoxic-isch-
emic encephalopathy, documenting that the obstetrician 
caused this child’s damaged condition. And sometimes 
these attorneys win.
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 Why cannot we attach the name ‘newborn encepha-
lopathy’ to neonatal unresponsiveness accompanied by 
brainstem dysfunction and/or seizures? Doing so would 
avoid the fallacy of single cause attribution.
 Extrapolating from the observation that ischemia 
causes brain damage in the laboratory to the belief that 
hypoxia-ischemia is the single cause of PBD in humans 
invokes both the misconception possibility to fact and 
this misconception (single cause attribution). The inter-
relatedness of the misconceptions needs to be kept in 
mind when either one misconception is identified. Might 
another unstated misconception have been invoked?
 Despite early  [21] and widespread  [60] recognition 
that all diseases have multiple causes, the concept of sin-
gle-cause attribution appears to be widely accepted. We 
often see publications that include lists of cases and their 
putative causes, without showing any data on controls. It 
even made its way into the language of imaging colleagues 
who describe what they identify on ultrasound pictures 
as ‘ischemic lesions’ [see  61 for discussion and critique of 
this concept]. We raise the possibility that names of enti-
ties/lesions that imply a known causation when the evi-
dence is not convincing can impede progress identifying 
the myriad contributors to PBD causation.
 Although we have attempted to avoid offending any-
one by not identifying papers that exemplified one of the 
misconceptions we address, we consider it appropriate to 
use our own work to illustrate how single-cause attribu-
tion was applied to a group of preterm children with ce-
rebral palsy, the clinical neurodevelopmental symptom 
strongly associated with WMD  [62] . The presence of cer-
tain characteristics in these individual children’s histo-
ries (e.g. cord prolapse) was assumed a ‘definite explana-
tion’ of the child’s cerebral palsy, that of others (such as 
‘severe postnatal asphyxia’) a ‘possible explanation’. In-
terestingly, this way of attributing single causes yielded 
32% explained, 32% possibly explained, and 36% not ex-
plained cases. This result is not very different from what 
would be expected if one of three possible outcomes had 
been attributed by chance (1 of 3 = 33.3%).
 A sophisticated extension of the single cause attribu-
tion concept is the etiological pathway concept  [63, 64] . 
This theory suggests that in individual infants, several 
different (but distinct) pathways can culminate in brain 
damage. The clear advantage of this concept is that not 
all cases of PBD are assumed equal with regard to causal 
mechanisms. A much more realistic way is to look at dis-
ease causation from the probabilistic perspective, which 
holds that ‘the presence of X increases the likelihood of 
the occurrence of Y’ (see ‘Determinism vs. Probabilism’ 
above). However, this concept may be of limited use in 
individual patients. We advise against offering numbers 
and percents to parents, either in matters of causation or 
prognosis.
 Nevertheless, the probabilistic approach offers enor-
mous advantages in etiologic research and causal infer-
ence. Moreover, it paves the way for what is now consid-
ered the standard of sophisticated etiologic research, i.e. 
elaborate multivariable data analysis. Only this approach 
allows for the modeling of a multicausal network, the 
closest theoretical framework for the study of the multi-
etiologic natural history of diseases.
 Generalization 
 Sometimes, we are sure we have found the cause of 
PBD  in a single individual newborn. A catastrophic situ-
ation such as placental abruption is often considered 
highly suggestive of being the initiator of perfusion dis-
turbances and associated energy failure, leading to PBD 
 [65] . It is eminently conceivable that even in such a sup-
posedly clear-cut situation, the origin of the observed 
brain damage might actually be what led to the catastro-
phe, e.g. infection/inflammation  [66–68] , not the catas-
trophe itself (placental abruption). Thus, we consider it 
reasonable to argue that the mere observation of a rather 
suggestive co-occurrence (see ‘Co-Occurrence in Indi-
viduals vs. Association in Populations’ above) of a plau-
sible cause (here: abruption) and effect (here: PBD) in 
single clinical instances should not trigger the clinician’s, 
judge’s, lawyer’s, or jury member’s generalization that in 
all babies with placental abruption any co-occurring PBD 
must be due to the abruption.
 Unstated Causal Inferences 
 Amniotic fluid embolism results in profound and pro-
longed maternal hypotension, which interferes with the 
placenta’s ability to provide the fetus with oxygen. If the 
mother’s circulation is not improved, she will die. If the 
fetus cannot be delivered in time, the fetus, too, will die. 
If the fetus is delivered alive, however, brain damage may 
have occurred.
 In light of this scenario, it seems eminently reasonable 
to invoke the ‘continuum of casualty’ hypothesis, which 
as applied to the brain, states that the same insult, if se-
vere kills, but if less severe kills not the entire individual, 
but only the most vulnerable cells, assumed to be neurons 
 [69] .
 Although on one level this hypothesis is plausible, it 
does not apply to less catastrophic situations, for example, 
when the term infant with newborn encephalopathy is 
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presumed to have suffered an intrapartum insult despite 
the mother having no documented physiologic distur-
bance. The inference that low blood pressure in a sick 
infant born months before term who is presumed to have 
impaired cerebral blood flow regulation leads to WMD 
can be viewed as another example of inappropriately ap-
plying the continuum of casualty hypothesis. The infer-
ential error tends to be made by those who are not aware 
that they are invoking the hypothesis  [70] . We encourage 
the explicit statement of all causal inferences.
 Unstated Assumption that What Might Be 
Heterogeneous Is Homogeneous 
 In PBD, this inferential error is exemplified by papers 
that list grade III/IV intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) 
as an outcome or a covariate  [71] . In such situations, a 
hemorrhage that fills the lateral ventricle (IVH) is equat-
ed with a large echodensity adjoining the lateral ventricle. 
An extension of this assumption is the assumption that 
WMD and IVH are etiologically equivalent. We are not 
arguing against the possibility that IVH is an antecedent 
or correlate of WMD damage. Rather, they just are not 
identical, nor should each be presumed to have exactly 
the same risk profile as the other.
 Use of the entity called ‘grade III/IV IVH’ assumes 
that grade III IVH is the same as grade IV in terms of eti-
ology, pathophysiology or consequences, depending on 
the setting in which it is used. Since what is called grade 
IV IVH might not be primarily a hemorrhage, continued 
use of the term perpetuates many errors and promotes 
inferential errors  [72] .
 When the borders of the lateral ventricle are lost and 
the ventricle contents cannot be distinguished from the 
surrounding echodense white matter, even highly com-
petent sonologists might not be able to tell where is the 
boundary between hemocephalus and adjacent normal 
or damaged white matter. This quandary is real. Limiting 
use of the ‘grade III/IV IVH’ to these situations is inap-
propriate. Failure to recognize the misconception leads 
to inferential errors.
 Our main point is that progress in our thinking about 
causation will not come until we define exposures and 
characteristics as homogeneously as possible and seek the 
antecedents of the most homogeneous outcome possi-
ble.
 Failure to Consider Alternative Explanations 
 In 1650, Oliver Cromwell wrote, ‘I beseech you, in the 
bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken’ 
 [73] . The last seven words of this quote constitute the 
Cromwellian challenge taught to students of epidemiol-
ogy. Unfortunately, some see a paper or a table of data that 
fits their favorite hypothesis and accept it without any 
reservation. We suggest that all findings and publications 
be interpreted with the Cromwellian challenge in mind.
 Conclusions 
 Research in the field of PBD is either observational or 
experimental [for an overview, see  4 ]. By definition, ob-
servational studies can only study association, but never 
prove causation. Experimental studies can show that an 
exposure ‘can’ produce an outcome, but this is never a 
‘must’ outside the experimental world. Apparently, caus-
al inference needs support from both observation and ex-
periment, from both epidemiology and laboratory re-
search  [5] . Thus, we propose that the more of the follow-
ing criteria are fulfilled, the stronger the support for the 
contention that some risk factor for PBD might be a ‘caus-
al’ factor:
 • the factor precedes PBD (however, even if it does, how 
do we distinguish ‘post hoc’ from ‘propter hoc’?); 
 • the factor can produce PBD in the experimental set-
ting (still, a clear definition of ‘can’ should be sought 
in future causality research); 
 • it is (statistically) associated with PBD in (well-pow-
ered) observational studies; 
 • its absence from populations reduces the prevalence of 
PBD compared to populations with the factor present, 
e.g. in clinical trials  [5] . 
 We do not suggest that our discussion and proposed 
criteria solve any theoretical issue in causation/causality 
research. Rather, we hope they can serve as guiding lights 
for clinicians and public health workers in the dark wil-
derness of causal inference and can contribute to fruitful 
research in this area, designed to reduce the individual 
and societal burden of PBD.
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